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A COMPARISON OF CIVIL AND COURT-MARTIAL
PROCEDURE
HOWARD CLARK, 2ND.*
A lawyer who was in the military service two years or so
during the World War once remarked to the writer, "For a legal
system that is administered entirely by laymen, Army courts-
martial function remarkably well." While it is not strictly
accurate to say that our courts-martial are administered entirely
by laymen, it is sufficiently near the truth, perhaps, to mark the
chief differentiation between criminal procedure in our civil
courts and that of military tribunals. The purpose of this
article is to compare, from a practical standpoint, civil and
military procedure in criminal cases and to explain how it is
possible for substantial justice to be evolved by a system of
judicature in which judges, prosecuting attorneys and defense
counsels alike are laymen-at least in the sense of being with-
out legal training except in extremely rare cases.
Such a comparative study will develop some very close paral-
lels and several wide divergences. For a starting point, it is
necessary to recognize the necessity for a separate system of
courts exclusively within the military establishment; first, be-
cause of the peculiar requirements of military discipline and the
fact that it would be impossible to proceed against offenders in a
civil court where strictly military offenses are concerned;'
second, because of the fact that military jurisdiction must be
exclusively personal, not territorial.2 To these basic considera-
* See p. 608 for biographical note.
1 Examples of "strictly military offenses," together with the Article of
War by which each is condemned, are: A. W. 54, fraudulent enlistment;
A. W. 55, procuring unlawful enlistment; A. W. 56, false muster; A. W. 57,
rendering false returns; A. W. 58-60, desertion, aiding or advising deserL
tion; A. W. 61, absence without leave; A. W. 62, disrespect toward the
President and other high officials; A. W. 63, disrespect toward superior
(military) officer; A. W. 64, 65, disobedience or insubordination; A. W. 66,
mutiny; A. W. 67, failure to suppress mutiny.
2 The question as to the residence or proper station of the accused has
no jurisdictional significance in court-martial procedure. It is quite pos-
sible for a soldier to enlist in the United States, desert in China and be
tried therefor in Panama. See also note (4).
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tions let us add the fact that military jurisdiction is criminal
(punitive) only, courts-martial taking no cognizance of private
litigation.
While civil courts having criminal jurisdiction are variously
classified, according to the practices of various states, as justice
courts, city courts, circuit courts, criminal courts and what not,
military tribunals are three in number-the summary court,
composed of one member only; the special court, of not less than
three members ;3 and the general court, of not less than five. Here
it is impossible to draw on exact analogy with civil practice, since
jurisdictional limitations are imposed by law both as to persons
and as to offenses.4 The summary court (except for its juris-
dictional limitation as to persons) may be roughly compared to
a justice of the peace; the special court, to a city court, or sim-
ilar tribunal taking cognizance generally of misdemeanors; and
the general court, to a circuit court or similar tribunal taking
cognizance of felonies and high crimes. 5 Of still more import-
ance are the limitations as to punishment. The summary court
may not adjudge confinement at hard labor in excess of one
month, nor "restriction to limits" in excess of three months, nor
forfeiture in excess of two-thirds of one month's pay. The spe-
cial court may adjudge confinement not in excess of six months,
and forfeiture not in excess of two-thirds pay per month for six
months. The general court is limited only by the executive
s Maximum limits for special and general courts-martial personnel were
prescribed for many years, but removed with the adoption of the Manual
for Courts-Martial, 1921. In practice, five members are usually detailed
for a special court, and generally nine or eleven for a general court. When
either court is reduced in membership to the minimum number by reason
of challenges, death, or other cause, it is the custom to appoint new mem-
bers. Of course, a court reduced below the minimum number of members
has no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of any case. Par. 58f,
M. C. M., 1928.
4 Pars. 12, 14 and 16, M. C. M., 1928. These provisions are too compli-
cated to be reproduced here. In general, the sunxmiry court has jurisdic-
tion over enlisted men up to the grade of technical sergeant; the special
court, all persons in the military service except officers and warrant officers
for any crime, or offense not capital; the general court, all persons in the
military service, for any crime or offense. A. W. 12 to 14, incl.
5 In this connection it will be noted that military courts-martial have
no jurisdiction to try murder or rape cases in time of peace. Par. 7,
M. C. M., 1928; A. W. 92. "In time of peace" means a complete peace,
officially proclaimed: Kahn v. Anderson, 225 U. S. 1.
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orders, changed from time to time, announcing the limits of
punishment for all crimes and offenses.6
No discussion of the military penal system would be complete
without mention of one feature for which it would be very diffi-
cult to find a prototype in civil procedure-the disciplinary
power of the commanding officer under the 104th Article of War,
known in soldier parlance as "company punishment." This is
a highly convenient and effective device for the maintenance of
discipline in cases of trivial offenses.7 In operation it is highly
informal and takes on few of the features of a judicial proceed-
ing. No written charges are preferred, witnesses are not sworn,
and the only record kept is a brief notation in the soldier's ser-
vice record as to the date, nature of the offense and the punish-
ment imposed. "Company punishment" may only be used when
the soldier himself consents to it. Neither confinement nor for-
feiture of pay may be adjudged against a soldier s under the 104th
Article of War. Punishment consists of restriction to barracks
or camp not to exceed one week, extra fatigue duty, withdrawal
of privileges, and the like. Even after the soldier has consented
to punishment under the 104th Article of War, he may appeal
to the next higher commander if he deems his sentence unjust
or disproportionate to the offense.9
The "legal Bible" for the guidance and government of all
courts-martial procedure and matters related thereto, is the
Manual for Courts-Martial, prepared by the Judge Advocate
General's Department, and published by direction of the Presi-
dent. The current edition was published in 1928. Earlier edi-
tions appeared in 1917 and 1921. A little book of 341 pages,
including an exhaustive index and numerous appendices, the
present Manual is a marvel of comprehensive information. It
is a form-book, manual of practice, compendium of statute law
and treatise on evidence' o all rolled into one. Since all officers
6 Par. 104c, M. C. M., 1928. These punishments range all the way
from death to forfeiture of one day's pay.
7 Ch. XXIV, Ml. C. M., 1928; pars. 27, 69c, id.
s For a modification of this rule in the case of officers, see A. W. 104 and
pars. 106, 107, M. C. M., 1928. The 104th Article of War is very seldom
invoked against officers, except in time of war.
9 When passing on such an appeal the superior hears no witnesses.
He may modify the sentence but not increase it; nor may he, in any case,
impose a different kind of punishment. Par. 108, M. C. M., 1928.
10 This portion of the Book-Ch. XXV-is particularly interesting.
Considering its size-some thirty pages-it is a remarkably comprehensive
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
in the service are required to perform various duties in connec-
tion with courts-martial, a working knowledge of the contents
of the Manual is required of every commissioned officer. This is
accomplished, with typical Army thoroughness, by means of gar-
rison schools conducted by older and experienced officers. The
Manual is designed to answer fully every question that may arise
in the conduct of a trial by court-martial, from the time of the
commission of an offense until the sentence has been approved
and directed to be carried into effect. Since it is the only refer-
ence work or text to which court-martial officials ordinarly have
access, it must be admitted that the Manual performs its function
very well indeed." Notwithstanding its extreme condensation,
the Manual finds space for several informative and authorita-
tive discussions of legal matters not particularly a part of, but
closely related to, military law. As a few examples, may be cited
the question of habeas corpus with relation to courts-martial,12
and enlistment of minors.13
Whereas in civil jurisdictions the criminal statutes are very
voluminous, comprising in the annotated forms several large
books, the military tribunal finds its statute law in the Punitive
Articles of War-numbers 54 to 96, inclusive, and contained in
seven and one-half pages of fine print in the Manual. These
articles, however, are clearly explained as to the gist of the
offense and necessary proof in Chapter XXVI.14 Crimes which
are not in themselves purely military offenses-such as murder,
rape, arson, burglary, assault and battery, forgery, and the like
-are denounced, in the Articles of War, in the language of
appropriate sections of the Federal Penal Code of 1910. Numer-
ous crimes involving moral turpitude are grouped together in
and accurate summary of the rules of evidence. The material is skeleton-
ized, however, there being no annotations, references to authority, nor
discussions of the rules.
11 An officer who is detailed as Summary Court or as trial judge
advocate, president, law-member or defense counsel of a general or special
court very soon becomes intimately acquainted with the Manual-through
necessity. Officers of limited service are detailed in these capacities only
in emergencies.
12 Par. 153ff, M. C. M., 1928.
Is Par. 157ff, M. C. M., 1928.
14 Pertinent passages from this chapter are required to be read, in full,
to the court, by the trial judge advocate, during his opening statement,
very much the same as the statutes are read to a jury by the prosecuting
attorney in a criminal case in civil court. Par. 75b, M. C. M., 1928.
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the 93rd Article of War,15 while murder and rape are denounced
by the 92nd Article. Articles 54 to 95 set forth specific crimes,
while the 96th, known in the service as the "shotgun article,"
denounces "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good
order and military discipline, all conduct of a nature to bring
discredit upon the military service, and all crimes or offenses not
capital, though not mentioned in these (foregoing) Articles,"
and punishment imposed upon a finding of guilty under this
Article is discretionary with the court.16
In civil procedure, each state, by statute, prescribes the forms
by which criminal prosecutions are instituted-information, affi-
davit, or indictment. In most states both affidavit and indict-
ment are used, depending upon the type of crime involved and
the court before which trial is to be had. Requirements as to
the preparation of these documents are generally very strict and
technical, and the average criminal lawyer seizes upon some pin-
hole flaw in warrant, affidavit or indictment with great glee, as
affording the opportunity to push his client through the net of
the law to freedom. Only one form is used to institute proceed-
ings, before courts-martial, and its preparation is so simple and
so free from technicalities that even an inexperienced officer or
company clerk finds it but a minor task.l7 The front page of
the charge-sheet contains all the information relative to the
accused which the trial judge advocate, the defense counsel and
the court proper, may need. This includes the name, organiza-
tion, rank, station, enlistment period and rate of pay of the
accused ;18s place of confinement, if any; names of witnesses for
15There are manslaughter, mayhem, arson, burglary, housebreaking,
robbery, larceny, embezzlement, perjury, forgery, sodomy, assault with
intent to commit a felony, assault with a deadly weapon and assault with
intent to do bodily harm.
16 While there is a special Article of War dealing with the offense of
drunkenness on duty (A. W. 85), all other offenses under the Federal pro-
hibition law are lodged under the 96th A. W. On the other hand, A. W. 95
reads "Any officer or cadet who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the service," and it has
been held that offenses under A. W. 95 and A. W. 96 are not the same,
and that conviction of an officer under both articles on the same facts is
not illegal as placing him twice in jeopardy for the same offense: McRae
v. Henkes, 273 Fed. 178; Opinions, Judge Advocate General, 1922, p. 118.
17 Chs. VI, VII, M. C. M., 1928.
'
8 Data as to previous convictions and/or punishment under A. W. 104
is not furnished on the charge sheet itself, but on separate paper accom-
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the United States and for the defense, and where they may be
found. The matter which sets forth the offense proper is of
two parts: the charge, which is merely the number of the
Article of War concerned; and the specifzation, which describes
concisely but fully the nature of the offense under that Article.
Forms for the preparation of charges under every Article of
War are furnished in the Manual, and very rarely indeed are
departures therefrom necessary.19 The signature of the officer
preferring the charges and his oath either (a) that he has per-
sonal knowledge of the matters set forth, or (b) that he has
investigated the same and that they are true in fact, to the best
of his belief, complete the charge sheet.
In civil practice, arrest of evildoers is hedged about by many
restrictions; without a warrant, a peace officer may make an
arrest only when a misdemeanor is committed in his presence,
or when he has reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has
been, or is about to be, committed. Military law makes a dis-
tinction between arrest and confinement, the former denoting
moral restraint only, the latter actual physical restraint.20 Any
officer may order any enlisted man into arrest or confinement
when he has knowledge of, or has inquired into, the alleged
offense. For ordinary offenses confinement is not usually em-
ployed, unless circumstances clearly require physical restraint.21
In court-martial procedure there is no provision for bail or any
form of bond or surety upon which an accused is released from
arrest or confinement pending trial. Officers are confined only
under most unusual circumstances; and only the commanding
officer may order commissioned personnel into arrest or confine-
ment.22 Nor is it necessary that charges be drawn up or pre-
ferred before an offender may be placed in arrest or confinement;
but the official who orders an offender into arrest or confinement
is required to prefer charges, or in some way initiate proceedings
panying the charges, and the court is only apprised of such information
after a finding of guilty has been reached. Par. 79, M. C. M., 1928.
19 Appendix 4, M. C. M., 1928. A typical charge and specification
alleging larceny is as follows: "Charge I-Violation of the 93rd Article
of War. Specification: In that Private John Smith, Co. A, 1st Infantry,
did, at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, on or about January 1, 1929, feloniously
take, steal and carry away one gold watch, value about $100 the property
of Sergeant William Jones, Co. A, 1st Infantry."
20 A. W. 60; Par. 139a, M. C. M., 1928.
21 Army Regulations 600-355, 600-375; par. 19, M. C. M., 1928.
22 Par. 20, M. C. M., 1928.
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against the accused, at once-in any case, within twenty-four
hours.23
After the submission of charges, the next step is a procedure
which is faintly analogous to the function of a grand jury, except
that ordinarily grand juries are empowered to investigate
"felonies and certain misdemeanors," while every set of charges
that reaches the commanding officer's desk is investigated, with-
out delay, by that official or by someone appointed by him. It is
the investigating officer's duty to inquire into all the facts, ex-
amine witnesses, and make a recommendation as to the disposi-
tion of the case. If the offense be not too serious, the command-
ing officer may refer it for trial to a summary court or a special
court which he himself appoints. If the offense be of a serious
nature, the charges, together with the report of the investigating
officer, are sent to the military commander having general court-
martial jurisdiction;24 and by the latter, with the advice of his
staff judge advocate, or legal adviser, disposition of the case is
made. If this officer decides that the charges and specifications
can be sustained, and that the offense is of sufficient gravity to
merit trial by general court, the case is referred directly to the
proper general court for trial. The analogy here, of course, is
the finding of the "true bill" by the grand jury. He may also
at his pleasure direct that charges be dropped, action taken under
the 104th Article of War, or that trial be had by an inferior
court.25
As to the organization and functioning of a military court for
the trial proper, the system can best be described as a combined
judge-and-jury system, except for the fact that many of the
very objectionable features of our jury scheme in civil life are
entirely lacking. In the first place, court-martial duty is by
regulation-and by what is even more compelling, the ancient
traditions of the military service-a highly important, almost
23 If circumstances are such that charges cannot immediately be pre-
ferred, the commanding officer must be notified at once. As will later
become apparent herein, no unnecessary delay of any sort in the prosecu-
tion of a case is tolerated. A. W. 70.
24A.W. 8 prescribes the military commanders who have authority to
appoint general courts-martial, and hence have power to refer cases to
such courts for trial. In general, corps area and higher commanders are
so empowered.
25 Chapter VII, M. C. M., 1928. Procedure at this point may become
somewhat complicated by the raising of the issue of insanity, minority, etc.
Proper action in each case is prescribed in the Manual.
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sacred obligation. Every detail is carried out with extreme
punctiliousness. From the time the newly-appointed officer first
pins on his insignia of rank, he is constantly impressed with the
necessity of serious, earnest attention to this duty and the culti-
vation of an impartial and judicial power of judgment. Bearing
in mind the general educational and professional qualifications
of commissioned personnel, it is not difficult to see in what
respects the deliberations of courts-martial are superior to those
of our hit-or-miss civil juries.
The officers of a military court are (1) the president, who is
always the senior member present, whether so designated by
name or not; (2) the law member, who is legal adviser to the
court, and who has certain specific duties imposed by regula-
tions ;26 the trial judge advocate, who is to all intents and pur-
poses the prosecuting attorney; and the defense counsel.27 The
president and the law member have equal voice and vote with
the other members upon any question. The trial judge advocate
and the defense counsel, of course, have nothing whatever to do
with the deliberations of the court.
The steps in the trial are very closely comparable to those in
a criminal case in any civil court. After the court is in order,
the right to challenge is accorded both prosecution and defense,
in turn, exactly as a jury is ordinarily chosen.28 The court, the
trial judge advocate and the reporter are sworn. Each side may
make, or may waive, an opening statement; evidence is heard,
and cross-examination is conducted,2 9 exactly as in civil courts.
26 Pars. 4c, 38, 51, 58a and 84, M. C. M., 1928. The law member rules
on all interlocutory questions other than challenges, subject to the objec-
tion of any member; makes the statutory warnings and explanations to
the accused upon his plea of guilty, etc. The law member is subject to
challenge for cause only.
27 A defense counsel is regularly appointed for each special and general
court. The accused may ask for a particular officer to be detailed as his
counsel, who will in every case be so detailed if the exigencies of the
service permit. In addition, the accused may be represented by civilian
counsel at his own expense, if he desires. While every courtesy is extended
to civilian counsel appearing before military tribunals, generally the civ-
ilian lawyer is handicapped by his lack of familiarity with court-martial
procedure. Employment of civilian counsel is infrequent. A.W. 17; par.
43, M. C. M., 1928.
28 Each side, however, has but one peremptory challenge, regardless of
the nature of the offense. Civil courts ordinarily allow more-sometimes as
many as 20 in capital cases. Par. 51, M. C. M., 1928.
29 Written depositions may be used in evidence in military courts
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There are no instructions, as in civil courts, because each mem-
ber of the court is both a judge and a juryman. The trial judge
advocate makes the first closing argument for the United States;
the defense counsel may reply, and if he does, the prosecution
has a final argument.3 0
Whereas in civil courts the jury leaves the courtroom to de-
liberate on its verdict, in military procedure the situation is
reversed; all persons in the courtroom except the members of
the court withdraw, and the court, by secret ballot, arrives at
a finding. Unanimous vote is not required except in cases where
the death penalty is mandatory by law.8' Three-fourths of the
members present must concur in cases where life imprisonment,
or imprisonment for more than ten years, are concerned. In all
other cases a two-thirds vote is sufficient to support a finding of
guilty. On all questions other than findings and sentence, a
majority vote is determinative.
Voting on the sentence is done the same way, and governed
by the same principles, the court in the meantime having re-
opened to receive data from the trial judge advocate as to the
previous convictions, length of service and rate of pay of the
accused. If an acquittal is arrived at upon voting on the find-
ings, it is immediately announced in open court, and the accused
is at once released from custody. In the event of findings of
guilty, both findings and sentence are announced in open court,
at the conclusion of which the court immediately adjourns.32
In its finding, the military court has one privilege that the
judge or jury in the civil court does not always have: if the
evidence fails to prove the particular offense charged, but does
prove a lesser and included offense, the court may so find, amend-
ing the charges and specifications by exceptions and substitu-
tions. Thus, absence without leave is a lesser and included
(except in capital cases) by the prosecution, and by the defense in all
cases. A. W. 25; par. 119, M. C. M., 1928.
30 By custom in courts-martial, no time limit is placed on closing argu-
ments, although the regulations are silent on this point. Par. 77 M. C. M.,
1928.
31 A.W. 43.
32 The announcement takes this form (spoken by the president of the
court): "Private Smith, the court finds you of the specification guilty, and
of the charge guilty, and sentences you to be dishonorably discharged from
the service of the United States, to forfeit all pay and allowances due and
to become due, and to be confined at such place as the reviewing authority
may direct for a period of two years." Appendix 9, M. C. M., 1928.
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offense of desertion; and assault is a lesser and included offense
of assault with intent to kill.ss
It is with respect to the matter of appeal that the widest
divergence between civil and military practice is noted. The
writer has frequently heard the statement made by non-military
persons that there is no appeal from the sentence of a court-
martial. This is even more inaccurate than the popular belief,
mentioned at the beginning of this article, that the whole system
of military courts is administered by laymen. A short answer
is, that every case tried by court-martial is appealed. True it is
that we do not have, in military law, a formal appeal such as
is afforded from decisions of trial courts in civil practice. In-
stead, is a system of supervision and scrutiny of the record of
trial, by the appointing authority, or by higher authority. The
nature and extent of this review is determined (a) by the rank
of the accused, and (b) by the sentence imposed. Confirmation
by the President of the United States is required in the following
cases: (a) any sentence respecting an officer of the grade of
brigadier-general or above; (b) any sentence extending to the
dismissal of an officer;34 (c) any sentence extending to the
suspension or dismissal of a cadet of the Military Academy;
(d) any sentence of death." Confirmation by the President in
all these cases is preceded by a thorough survey of the record
by the Board of Review, composed of not less than three officers
of the Judge Advocate General's Department. The purpose of
this review is exactly that of an appellate court in civil procedure
-i. e., to ascertain whether the evidence is sufficient in law to
support the finding and sentence, and to assure that every sub-
stantial right of the accused was safeguarded during the whole
procedure.8 5 The power of the President to confirm, of course,
33 Pars. 78, 148, 149 and 152, M. C. M., 1928. A typical example of
such a finding is as follows: "of the specification, guilty, except the words
'desert' and 'in desertion'; substituting therefor, respectively, the words
'absent himself without leave from! and 'without leave'; of the excepted
words not guilty, of the substituted words, guilty. Of the charge, not
guilty, but guilty of violation of the 61st Article of War." So foreign
is this principle to the practice in civil procedure that civilian lawyers,
upon coming into contact with it for the first time, frequently have
trouble with its application.
34 Subject to certain exceptions, not material here, in time of war.
A.W. 48; Digest, Opinions of the Judge Advocate General, 1919, p. 46.
35 On this matter the regulations are very explicit. A. W. 46, 50,
53, incl.
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is inclusive of his power to confirm so much only of a finding of
guilty as involves a finding of guilty of a lesser and included
offense; the power to confirm or disapprove the whole or any
part of the sentence; and the power to remand for rehearing,
under the provisions of Article of War 501.3 6
Sentences of general courts-martial in cases not required to
be confirmed by the President are acted upon by appointing
authorities, by and with the advice of their respective staff
judge advocates, who are officers of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Department. The review by staff judge advocates is
similar in scope to that of the Board of Review, and is conducted
for the same purpose. Confirmation of the proceedings of
special and summary courts-martial rests with the respective
appointing authorities, and inasmuch as post and regimental
commanders do not have staff judge advocates, the matter is
left largely to the conscience, judgment and legal knowledge
of these commanding officers. These tribunals are courts of
record only to the extent that a summary of the evidence appears
in the record.3 7 The writer is of the opinion that the non-exist-
ence of a review by legally trained personnel in cases tried by
special and summary courts-martial is a weak link in our chain
of military law administration. However, in a varied experi-
ence of more than ten years, but one case is recalled in which the
rights of the accused were placed in jeopardy, and in that case
the circumstances were such that no substantial miscarriage of
justice resulted.38
30 Similarly, the power to order the execution of a sentence includes
the power to mitigate or remit the whole or any part thereof. A. W. 50.
37 The Act of Congress of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 575) authorizes
the employment of stenographic reporters for special courts, but in prac-
tice considerations of economy usually limit the employment of reporters
to general court trials. A. W. 115.
38 The writer was defense counsel for a soldier being tried on three
specifications under one charge. The evidence fully supported a finding
of guilty as to two specifications, but failed utterly as to the third. The
court found accused guilty of all three specifications, but the sentence
imposed was one which would have been legal had it been adjudged upon
a finding of guilty on one specification only.
